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Well, what would you do? Reflections on the need for a theory of bankruptcy law 
 





Bankruptcy law in England and Wales has no underpinning written theory, being driven by 
commercial and political imperatives. Bankruptcy laws elsewhere suggest that if we drew up 
bankruptcy law from scratch, the law would neither be inconvenienced by the lack of theory 




There is no written theory of English and Welsh bankruptcy law, and, says Dr John Tribe of 
Liverpool University, there ought to be.1  This article is both a celebration of his article and a 
critique of parts of it. His article is particularly to be commended for its thoughtful and well-
informed views on why there is so little research on the law of bankruptcy, and so little 
engagement within the legal profession with an underlying theory of bankruptcy.  
 
In response to Tribe’s article, Stubbins attempted to establish a sense of direction which 
could be applied to future English bankruptcy law, instead of the pragmatic and piecemeal 
 
1 Tribe “Why the theory of English and Welsh bankruptcy law is not yet written”2019 ICCLRD, 30(9) 473-489. 
The title of his article is a deliberate echo of Professor Maitland’s inaugural essay at Cambridge University, 
which considered the absence of a written theory of English law. 
approach which appears to be currently in place.2 He too, as indeed do other scholars in the 
field, laments the absence of a theoretical underpinning to English bankruptcy law, noting, as 
is well known, Sir Kenneth Cork’s lack of interest in any theories in his Report of the Review 
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, and the absence of any reference to theories in 
the White Papers leading up to the Insolvency Act 1986 or the Enterprise Act 2002. 
 
My approach is that while these reasons for the absence of such a theory of English and 
Welsh bankruptcy law are correct, the wider question is whether having a theory would 
actually make any difference. Just because some people would like there to be a theory does 
not mean that we have to have one, or that if there were one it would make any difference. In 
the practicalities of government, would legislators care whether there were a theory or not? In 
my limited experience of helping shape legislation in precisely this area, as will be discussed 
later, policy-formers showed no interest in theory, being far more for interested in what 
worked, while politicians were mostly interested in what induced most political gain, and 
least political pain, for their party. Tribe suggests that without a theory of bankruptcy law, 
“legislation and the results that flow from that legislation in terms of policy outcomes are 
incoherent”. Having been closely involved in the production of bankruptcy legislation 
myself, I do not think the legislation that we produced was incoherent. It works well enough; 
few laws work perfectly. “Incoherent” is a strong word to use for a process that however well 
it is drawn up will result in some losers and some winners; over time the winners and losers 
inevitably change.  
 
But before we even think about theories of bankruptcy law, we have to decide what we mean 
by a theory, and in what respects a written theory would differ from an unwritten theory.   
 
2 Stubbins, “What kind of world are we living in? Creditor wealth maximisation, contractarianism or multiple 
values in the post-Enterprise Act 2002 insolvency regime?” 2019 Insolv. Int.  32(2), 78-84.  
 
A scientific theory, is one, as  Stephen Hawking says, "a good theory if it satisfies two 
requirements: It must accurately describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model 
that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predictions about the 
results of future observations."3 A good theory should enable you to be sure about the 
certainty of a future event, as evidenced by past performance of the subject matters of the 
theory. The theory also ought to explain certain phenomena.  
 
This may be true of a scientific theory. Should a theory about law be any different? One 
would have thought not, but as there are clearly dozens of theories about law generally, never 
mind theories of bankruptcy law, it is hard not to suspect that some theories are not so much 
about establishing certainty in future decision-making, but are instead the advancement of a 
particular point of view, or at worst a prejudice, that may be applied, with varying degrees of 
practicality, to certain aspects of the law, or which may help to analyse the deficiencies of 
any existing rules of law.  A good legal theory might, for example, be able to explain why the 
law is as it is. A Marxist theory of law, for example, might say that much business and 
property law gives legitimacy to the prevailing values of dominant economic groups. A 
feminist theory of law might suggest that much law has been drawn up from a male 
standpoint to maintain male privileges at women’s expense.  
 
Other theories of law are not so much a viewpoint but a statement of what some think the law 
actually is. A positive lawyer’s theory of law will  say that the law is what statute and case 
law says it is. A natural lawyer’s theory of law will say that law is the expression of inherent 
rights conferred by God, nature or reason.   
 
3 Hawking, Stephen (1988). A Brief History of Time.  
 
The problem is that the word “theory” has many uses. Perhaps, then, we need to be clearer in 
our definitions. Let us put legal theories into different categories, called frameworks. 
 
The first framework is for explanations of what in practice happens in law. These could be 
called realist frameworks.  
 
The second framework is for explanations of how the current the currrent law arose – with a 
strong emphasis on history, and on inbuilt advantage for some participants at the expense of 
others. There is then usually either a philosophical expectation, or a commercial expectation, 
that in future that advantage should cease and be conferred on other, in the theorist’s view, 
worthier recipients. This could be called a reconstructionist framework. 
 
The third is the visionary framework. This is where the theorist puts forward his or her ideal 
form of what the law should be. This looks at the two previous frameworks and building 
upon them, or possibly even rejecting them, advances a new ideal framework which, in the 
theorist’s view, would be much better than the existing ones.  
 
These three frameworks tend to slide into each other. The idealist framework is the 
reconstructionist framework but just taken further forward. Hawkins’s use of the word 
“theory” relies on the ability to explain future phenomena using the theory. Of these three 
frameworks, the realist framework is likely to give a reasonable future understanding of who 
in practice will get what out of a legal dispute. The reconstructionist framework will again 
broadly indicate who will get what, but will agitate for change to make the future resolution 
of similar disputes fairer, in the theorist’s view, than the current practice. The idealist 
framework gives very little indication of the future resolution, as the whole procedure needs 
to be started again from scratch and a new and different process started.  
 
How does this apply to bankruptcy law? 
 
Theories of bankruptcy law 
As it happens, there are various theories, or models, of bankruptcy law.  The best-known ones 
are the the Creditors Wealth Maximisation,  the Creditors’ Bargain, and the Multiple Values 
Approach, followed by Contractarianism. There are other theories or models not addressed 
here. Not surprisingly, there is no one  theory, model or approach that covers all situations. 
They each have some value, but each one has its drawbacks.  
 
Creditors Wealth Maximisation 
Creditors wealth maximisation is an example of the realist framework in operation, and is 
probably the best known and in practice probably the most followed theory.4  This is not to 
say that legislators actively set out to follow this theory. It is more the case that its proponent, 
Jackson, and his followers looked at the existing law and saw what it did. It seeks the best 
return possible for pre-insolvency creditors, both secured and unsecured. A standard regime 
prevents any one creditor benefitting unduly at the expense of others, treats categories of 
creditors equally, allows for the possibility of the better parts of a business being sold on, and 
keeps costs down by the application of a clear set of mandatory rules.  
It is not difficult to see how this grew out of early bankruptcy laws. A debtor would declare 
himself bankrupt: an auctioneer would sell all his assets, a trustee would divide the sale 
 
4 T. Jackson, "Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain” (1982) 91(5) Yale L.J. 
857. It was further developed in D. G. Baird and T. Jackson, "Corporate Reorganisations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy" (1984) 
51 U. Chic. L. Rev. 97 and in T. Jackson and R. Scott, "On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain" (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 115. 
proceeds between the various creditors in proportion to their claims, and the debtor would be 
free to start again in business if he could, subject to any local restrictions. That others might 
be willing to go along with this would be because one day it might be their turn. Early 
colonists, settling in far-flung parts of the world and adopting a capitalist system and having 
to make their own laws from scratch, would probably have drawn up a similar process.  
Its deficiency is that it takes little account of the wider public interest, tort victims, 
employees, the debtor’s family, or the debtor’s behaviour. The rules do not differentiate 
between a debtor who was bankrupted through no fault of his own and the debtor who 
callously defrauded his creditors. Nor does it distinguish between a debtor running a business 
who probably could start again, and perhaps even pay something towards his creditors, and a 
debtor living on benefits who may never be able to hold down a job. Involuntary non-
financial creditors, such as a polluted environment, are not generally able to make a claim on 
the debtor’s estate. It does not take account of the needs of post-insolvency creditors. It is 
also a sudden-death process: you are either bankrupt or you are not. There is no possibility of 
a moratorium, while the debtor’s affairs are sorted out and creditors’ claims postponed, until 
the debtor gets on his or her feet again.  
 
The Creditors’ Bargain 
The creditors’ bargain approach, which is also an example of the realist framework, starts 
with the premise that creditors agree, or accept, before dealing with a debtor that if the debtor 
fails, each creditor will be repaid, so far as possible, in accordance with predetermined 
statutory priorities and contractual agreements. In this respect it is not greatly different from 
the creditors wealth maximisation approach, but it assumes that all creditors “agree” or accept 
their respective risks, and that they willingly and knowingly enter into contracts with the 
debtor and each other. While it is true that various secured creditors may, as in a ranking 
agreement or deed of priority, agree beforehand who will get what in the event of the debtor’s 
insolvency, it is not generally the case that creditors either sit around with each other agreeing 
their respective claims against the debtor or are aware of other creditors’ contractual 
agreements with the debtor. Many creditors may not even known of the existence of other 
creditors, let along the terms of those other creditors’ contracts with the debtor. HMRC does 
not knowingly and willingly enter contracts with debtors or the other creditors. On the other 
hand, creditors will know that they will be repaid according to predetermined statutory 
priorities, and to some extent they agree to that by contracting within a legal system that 
allows for such priorities. 
A variation of the Creditors’ Bargain, and perhaps an example of the reconstructionist 
framework, is that although debtors and creditors agree that they will submit to being repaid 
in accordance with the predetermined statutory priorities, creditors nevertheless will self-
interestedly jockey amongst themselves to advance themselves within the order of priorities 
(ideally at others’ expense), perhaps by seeking to change the legislation, or persuading the 
courts that the existing case law should be changed to their advantage.5 As an example of the 
former, administrative receivership prior to the Enterprise Act 2002 conferred an enormous 
advantage to the floating charge holder, at the expense of most unsecured creditors. While 
this may have seen to be rent-seeking by banks, banks justified their privileged position by 
claiming to charge lower interest rates than might otherwise have been the case. Nevertheless 
over time the interest of unsecured creditors and employees was considered more worthy than 
preserving banks’ privileges. Under the Enterprise Act 2002 qualifying floating charges were 
introduced by the then Labour government in the hope the prescribed part would go some 
way to protect unsecured creditors’ needs,6 and that administrators would make more effort 
 
5 F. Tung and M. J. Roe, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain 99 
(2013) Virginia Law Review 1236 (2013). 
6 There appears to be little evidence that this worthy objective was achieved: S. Frisby, Report on Insolvency 
Outcomes: Presented to the Insolvency Service (26 June 2006), pp.55-56; P. Walton and C. Umfreville, Pre-
than administrative receivers to rescue companies, and thus keep employees in jobs. The 
employees might then be grateful to the political administration that had looked after their 
interests. After all, employees vote in elections, and creditors cannot.   
The change was indeed at the banks’ expense, so as an inducement to get the banks to accept 
the change, the favoured position of HMRC in administrative receivership was reduced. 
Ultimately the change was at taxpayers’ expense.  
As an example of changing the case law, the Scottish law on the equivalent of transactions at 
an undervalue was overturned in the case of Macdonald v Carnbroe Estates7  where it was 
established that a creditor who shortly before the debtor company’s liquidation had in good 
faith paid less than full value for an asset belonging to the debtor, and who accordingly was 
required to required to return it to the liquidator,8 was entitled to claim in the liquidation, but 
not as a postponed creditor, as had previously been the case. This overturned many years’ 
worth of previous decisions and introduced a degree of judicial discretion not previously 
evident.   
The creditors’ bargain theory, as varied, certainly is also quite close to what happens in real 
life.  Even as varied, though, it suffers from many of the same faults as the creditors wealth 
maximisation approach.  
 
The Multiple Values Approach 
This theory, advanced by Senator Warren, one of the former contenders for the Democratic 
leadership in the USA, is very different.9 It is an example of a visionary framework. Instead 
of pre-insolvency creditors dominating the proceedings, each insolvency should be assessed 
 
Pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome Analysis of Pre-Pack Administration (Final Report to the 
Graham Review, April 2014); K. Akintola, ‘What is left of the Floating Charge?An Empirical Outlook’ (2015) 7 
JIBFL 404.  
7 [2019] UKSC 57. 
8 As required by 242(4)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
9 E. Warren, "Bankruptcy Policy" (1987) 54 U. Chic. L. Rev. 775. 
individually, with the debtor’s losses being accepted by those who can afford to bear them 
while his assets are distributed amongst those who most need them. This idealistic approach, 
commendable in terms of social justice, but probably difficult to operate in practice, appears 
not to have been adopted anywhere, not least because it is would be expensive and, 
unpredictable. Who decides who is best able to bear losses or most deserving to receive 
assets, and what criteria would be used? Would it help rescue businesses? How would it deal 
with fraud? What does it do to the cost of money? If a country adopted this process, why 
would anyone lend money in that country at all? The approach assumes that creditors would 
be unnaturally self-denying and willing to accept losses for the greater good, something 
probably only possible in a small and altruistic society or a closed religious or social 
community. For that very reason, it is impractical, unrealistic and unlikely ever to be used.  
 
Contractarianism and communitarianism. 
 
This is a sort of half-way house between Creditor Wealth Maximisation and the Multiple 
Values Approach. Contractarianism assumes that most people essentially are self-seeking and 
will try to optimise their own benefits, but can be persuaded to forgo their total self-interest 
by accepting some legal or moral constraints on their own behaviour, provided the same is 
expected of others.10 The idea is the net end result of universal acceptance of this social 
contract over time is more profitable than trying, and sometimes failing, to maximise one’s 
own return on every occasion. Communitarianism is a more public-spirited version of the 
same thing, with less emphasis on the individual and more on the collective benefit of and the 
moral expectation of being a good citizen. Were contractarianism to be applied to bankruptcy 
law, the range of claimants on the debtor’s estate might not be limited to pre-insolvency 
 
10 D. Korobkin, "Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law" (1993) 71 Texas L. Rev. 
541; D. Korobkin, "The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates" (1996–7) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 75. 
creditors and involuntary creditors would receive more representation, but there would not be 
the free-for-all of the Multiple Values Approach: there would need to be statutory rules 
capable of enforcement. If communitarianism were to be applied to bankruptcy law, there 
would be probably be more attention paid to preventing people becoming bankrupt, either by 
educating them or looking after them better, or making creditors be more responsible in how 
they offer credit. Either way, there would be rules, and while having rules is to be welcomed, 
since it gives certainty, the bigger question is which post-insolvency creditors can make 
claims and which involuntary creditors are to receive representation.  
 
The fact that there is no one theory, model or framework that seems to satisfy all 
requirements, though some get quite close to it, is probably one of the reasons that 
practitioners and scholars of English and Welsh bankruptcy law do not appear, on the face of 
it, particularly interested in any overriding theory. If no theory appears to be wholly 
comprehensive, there is little advantage in using it as the basis of legal decision-making. In 
the meantime, the law appears to carry on in practice not noticeably suffering from the lack 
of any overriding theory.  
 
Perhaps the problem is that again the word “theory” is not ideal. Instead, what about seeking 
some generally accepted bankruptcy principles? A principle is an agreed starting point behind 
a legal structure. For example, the principle of registration of title is that registration confirms 
security of ownership, allows for the mortgaging of property and reduces the opportunity for 
disputes over ownership. Property may or may not be theft - one may or may not agree with 
the underlying principle of registration -  but an edifice of law is still built upon it.  
 
If it is a good principle, it may be transportable to a similar area of law and still be effective. 
If a set of bankruptcy principles is any good, it could be applied elsewhere. This indeed 
happened with corporate insolvency law: it was based on personal bankruptcy law. If the set 
is good, it ought to work in other countries and in other economic circumstances. The 
application of the set of principles should have predictable outcomes which people can expect 
to see replicated. And indeed, bankrutpcy and insolvency law is not very different, on the 
whole, throughout the developed world. The details may differ but the basic concepts remain 
the same. The range of creditors may slightly differ from country to country, but in practice 
they are broadly similar. 
 
 
The need for a set of principles 
Tribe’s well-made point is that in England and Wales there is no underlying written theory. It 
is all just legislation “driven by commercial practicalities with almost constant tinkering at 
the edges or to provide short-term headlines that an issue is being addressed”. Tribe believes 
that the country can do better than this: that there ought to be a proper theoretical background 
underlying bankruptcy which should be adhered to, and derogation from which would be 
undesirable. This should be separate from the policy matters that bankruptcy law is designed 
to deal with, namely asset preservation for creditors, realisation and distribution of assets 
from the bankrupt’s estate, the establishment of priorities amongst creditors and the 
rehabilitation of the debtor.   
 
Leaving aside theories for the moment, some of Tribe’s  “policy” matters are actually 
operational. Asset preservation and asset realisation and distribution are entirely practical 
matters. There have to be methods of looking after the debtor’s estate, and reclaiming it from 
those who may have been given it in order to defraud creditors. Trustees in bankruptcy need 
clear rules within which to operate, transparency and accountability. Statute provides these.  
 
The establishment of priorities 
Tribe is entirely right about one policy issue. The pecking order between the different groups 
of creditors must be a policy decision.  At the moment, who gets what is a political decision. 
An example of this  can be seen by the change to preferential creditors in ss.98 and 99 of the 
Finance Act 2020. HMRC will return to being a preferred creditor in respect of PAYE 
contributions (and certain other taxes), having not been so since the Enterprise 2002. This is 
precisely the sort of commercial practicality that Tribe deplores. The Government is short of 
money and sees this an easy way to get some money back. The fact that this may put up the 
cost of borrowing or reduce the sums available to other creditors is subsumed to the political 
exigency. Whether to bring back HMRC as a preferential creditor is a good or a bad thing 
probably does not matter. The reality is that the Government can do it if it wishes to do so, 
and even if there were a written theory of bankruptcy law, it would override that theory if it 
chose to do so. 
 
Nevertheless the establishment of priorities is still important. As Tribe has written elsewhere, 
certain financial groups have used their muscle to ensure more favourable treatment over 
others.11 Secured creditors are favourably placed. The traditional argument was that without 
good security, there would be no cheap loans, and no loans would mean less commerce. To 
this it may be replied that banks have to lend to exist as banks, and even if there were no or 
less priority of repayment, as encompassed by security, banks would still have to make loans 
in order to make money, albeit perhaps on different terms. While interest on loans continues 
 
11 J. Tribe, "Policy subversion" in corporate insolvency: political science, Marxism and the role of power 
interests during the passage of insolvency legislation”  2019 Insolv. Int., 32(2), 59-66.  
to be tax-deductible, it is going to remain advantageous to run businesses on borrowed funds, 
and it would be a bold nation that removed the tax-deductibility of interest. At the moment 
the finance industry is well placed at the top of the pile on insolvency, and short of a socialist 
revolution, it is unlikely to relinquish that position. And if it did, it would merely pass on its 
costs by other means to its customers.  
 
But there are other creditor groups who believe that their position should be better. Some say 
unsecured creditors should get a better deal (as in the prescribed part carved out of a floating 
charge). One notices here hints of the Multiple Value Approach. What about the 
environment? At present, if a quarry company becomes insolvent, so that it cannot maintain 
its quarries which then become filled with water and are dangerous, why is that liability 
socialised on insolvency so that the company’s problem is now the local authority’s, which 
may not be well placed to deal with the quarries?  Under such circumstances, should not the 
local authority have a broader proportion of the company’s assets than it does at present? 
What about the local community? What about customers? Increasingly customers of large 
businesses, especially in the holiday industry, or of airlines, seem to think that they have an 
automatic right to be treated better than other creditors, a right that is not evident in law. 
Previous generations of consumers might have been willing to take misfortune in their stride, 
but there are current proposals for changes to the law to protect consumers who have pre-paid 
for goods to be set aside for them12 and for retailer insolvency.13 The retailer is effectively 
using the prepayments as working capital, though some retailers would argue that unless they 
were allowed to use those funds as working capital they would not be able to operate at all. 
Touching as this proposed concern for consumers is, it has to be balanced with the fact that it 
is a large step to place consumers in a higher place than trade creditors, and that there is a 
 
12 Law Commission Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency, Report 368 13 July 2016.  
13 See the Law Commission Consultation Paper 246, Consumer Sales Contracts: Transfer of Ownership 27 July 
2020 
cost to satisfying many but small consumer claims which, if it resulted in less for trade 
creditors, would merely result in trade creditors passing on their costs to other consumers. 
What about employees? Having the employee’s preference limited to £800 (a figure 
unchanged since the Insolvency Act 1986) may seem absurd, but no Government has seen fit 
to change it. It might also be a good idea to carve out more protection for company employee 
pension funds.   
 
All these emotive claims on an insolvent person or business may have considerable electoral 
appeal, but may in practice turn out to be more complex than imagined. 
  
It is correct that there needs to be an informed debate about who should get priority in the 
event of someone’s bankruptcy’s or a company’s insolvency. This is ultimately a political 
battle, and it is also a matter of changing perceptions about what is important. Although 
employees and taxes have been priorities since the Bankruptcy Act 1869, it is only now that 
customers, pension schemes and the environment are beginning to be seen as equally 
deserving.  It is no accident that these are also probably the most complex creditors for whom 
to design some form of priority. 
 
What must not be forgotten, however, is that one group’s benefit is always at another’s loss, 
sometimes known as a zero-sum game.  If the rules are changed to be more beneficial to, say, 
employees, there will be less for others. You can change the size of the slices of the corporate 
pie that is the total of an insolvent company’s or debtor’s assets, but there is no magical 
method of making the overall pie any bigger.   
 
Other principles: Rehabilitation of the debtor 
As for rehabilitation of the debtor, some countries, such as Scotland, the USA and Canada, 
make some debtors undertake a course of financial education in the hope that if they learned 
some financial skills they might be less likely to become bankrupt again. As with most such 
ventures, this probably works well with a few, genuinely committed debtors, and not at all 
well with the socially irresponsible, or those who are likely always to have trouble managing 
their own lives. Interestingly, in the US some research was carried out to see what difference, 
if any, debtor education (which is mandatory as a result of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act 2005, which amended the existing Bankruptcy Code to this effect) 
made to debtors.14 The study suggested most of the participants interviewed for the study did 
not find their courses helped them in their financial lives, and that those who did make 
positive changes to their lives after bankrupcty did so not because of their financial education 
courses but because of the unpleasant experience of being bankrupt. Only about seven per 
cent found their courses beneficial in the way Congress had intended. This may reflect wider 
concerns about the particular Colorado demographic that was surveyed, or the quality of the 
courses themselves. It may also reflect participants’ resentment at being required to undertake 
the courses as part of their rehabilitation. It is perhaps wise that when Scotland introduced 
such courses, they were not made mandatory, but only take place where the trustee thinks the 
debtor would benefit from such a course and the debtor agrees to undertake such a course.15 
 
But leaving financial education aside,  a formal bankruptcy process does wipe the slate clean. 
Where a debtor is made bankrupt through no fault of his own, it would be a cruel society that 
provided no opportunity to start again. No such opportunities arose in previous generations, 
which led to the use of debtors’ prisons, such as the Marshalsea in London, where Charles 
Dickens’s father was incarcerated until such time as his family raised the funds to get him 
 
14 M.D. Sousa “Just punch my bankruptcy ticket: a qualitative study of mandatory debtor financial education” 
2013 Marquette Law Review 97, 391-465.  
15 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s. 117.  
out. Nowadays most countries have relatively  easy methods of enabling debtors to apply for 
their own bankruptcy, especially if the debtors are on benefits or have no other obvious 
methods of ever repaying their debts. Such debtors are known as the “can’t pay” debtors.  It 
is arguable that the relative ease of bankruptcy for such debtors may force credit-providers to 
be more considered in their provision of credit.  
 
At the same time, there are individuals who may be tempted repeatedly to use bankruptcy as 
a way of avoiding their obligations, sometimes known as the “won’t pay” debtors. The 
unkind would say that for them bankruptcy should be seen as a mark of irresponsibility, fraud 
or profligacy. Stigma for a few may be the price paid to encourage prudence, maturity and 
probity for most.  
 
There is no perfect solution to the problem that the law has to cope with both those who 
cannot pay their debts, and need as much help as society is willing to give them, and with 
those who have no compunction about not paying their debts and for whom bankruptcy holds 
no terrors. No legal system will ever manage this balance satisfactorily. Life may be better 
for bankrupts than in Dickens’s day, but few parents would, even nowadays, be thrilled to 
hear that one of their offspring was proposing to marry a bankrupt.  
 
Underlying principles relating to the debtor 
 
There are some principles, at least as regards the debtor’s position. They may be seen in what 
follows. 
 
Bankruptcy does not necessarily wipe out all debts.  
If debtors are earning enough to enable them to do so, they should contribute something 
towards their creditors’ losses. As an example of this, in 2007 the Scottish Parliament enacted 
the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007, which amended the previous law on 
bankruptcy and on diligence, diligence being the Scottish term for the enforcement of court 
decrees. The author was the advisor to the Culture and Enterprise Committee of the Holyrood 
Parliament that scrutinised the then Bill. The Act was the brainchild of the later Lord Wallace 
of Tankerville, who realised that Scotland’s insolvency and debt recovery rules would benefit 
from being revisited and updated. The Act (and its successor Acts) provided for new and 
accessible methods of helping debtors apply for their own bankruptcy, or sequestration as it is 
known. In particular, the various Acts devised a method of enabling debtors to contribute to 
paying their creditors, where they could, once the debtors had been made bankrupt, or even 
after the period of their bankruptcy. This is done by applying an algorithm to the debtor’s 
state of affairs, known as the common financial tool, to work out what income the debtor 
needs to live on and what could be paid, if anything, out of the debtor’s income to creditors.16  
Other debts not wiped out are student loans, allegedly because medical students might have 
chosen to become bankrupt at the end of their studies and then avoided repaying their student 
loans. Criminal fines and the requirement to aliment (or pay maintenance) to a former spouse 
or children are  also not wiped out.17  Similar rules apply in most other countries.  
 
A debtor should be allowed the the necessities of life.   
Most jurisdictions have provisions to prevent families being thrown out of their houses if a 
parent became bankrupt, or where this is allowed, it is only allowed within limited 
circumstances. Most countries allow the debtor some essentials of life, such as basic furniture 
and kitchenware, and the tools of his trade. 
 
16 Banktuptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s.89. 
17 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s.145.  
 
Bankruptcy should not endure for too long 
Traditionally, debtors in the UK remained bankrupt for three years. The one year period in 
English law was introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 in the fond hope that it would 
encourage entrepreneurs to start again in business quickly, and that this would be good for the 
economy. It was thought anomalous to have two different periods of bankruptcy depending 
on which side of the River Tweed one happened to be, so in 2007 Scotland also shortened its 
period of bankrutpcy to one year – a superb example of what Tribe calls “commercial 
practicality”.  It was thought at the time that the new lesser period of bankruptcy might 
mitigate the social awkwardness of being bankrupt, and would allow unfortunate but 
blameless entrepreneurs to start afresh in business. There is no evidence that reducing the 
period of bankruptcy to one year made much difference to the encouragement of 
entrepreneurs or to the economy. In Germany bankruptcy can last up to six years, and must 
be at least three. Many states in the USA have only one year’s worth of bankruptcy. Different 
countries appear to have different views of how long a bankrupt should remain bankrupt,  




Underlying expectations relating to creditors 
From Roman law, most jurisdictions have adapted the Actio Pauliana, which allows for the 
unwinding of certain voluntary obligations undertaken by the debtor in the period leading up 
to insolvency. In English law, these are seen in transactions at an undervalue and preferences. 
In Scotland they are known as gratuitous alienations and unfair preferences. The same view is 
taken of extortionate credit transactions, payments to pension schemes and payments in 
respect of divorce. If any of these have been done to deprive the creditors of sums which they 
otherwise would have received, they should be rescinded.  
 
Creditors should have the expectation that the trustee or liquidator acts in their collective 
interests if the debtor or company is insolvent, and the right to replace the trustee or 
liquidator if that person is being partial or incompetent. Creditors should also expect the 
trustee to have to be paid for his or her labours, where the State does not take over that 
responsibility. 
 
Creditors should have the the expectation that they will treated on a par with other creditors 
of their class, to be paid in full where possible, but rateably otherwise.  
 
 
What principles would be adopted if we were writing bankruptcy law from scratch? 
I venture to suggest that actually we would come up with something very similar to what we 
already have. The thorny issues are: 
 
(a) How easy should it be to make debtors bankrupt?  
(b) How much should debtors contribute out of their income to their creditors? 
(c) How much of the debtor’s assets should be unavailable to creditors? 
(d) To what extent should a debtor’s home be subject to bankruptcy procedures? 
(e) How does the law deal with pre-insolvency activities designed to thwart creditors? 
(f) For how long should debtors be subject to the penalties of bankrutpcy? 
(g) Within the different groups of creditors, both pre-insolvency and post-insolvency, 
who should rank higher than others? 
(h) How does the law cope with creditors whose interests are not obviously reducible to 
monetary sums?  
(i) How does the law manage to recover as much as possible from the “won’t pay” 
debtors, while being fair to the “can’t pay” debtors? 
(j) What protection does there need to be for trustees, and how accountable should they 
be? 
(k) What sanctions should be applied to those who do not follow the rules? 
(l) To what extent should moratoria be used to give debtors a breathing-space to sort out 
their affairs before formal insolvency procedures are started? 
 
 
One can quibble over the details of all of these, but these practical questions lie at the heart of 
all developed countries’ bankruptcy law. Each country tries to deal with them with varying 
degrees of success. Some countries are more debtor-friendly than others. Where the law is 
debtor-friendly, interest rates may be high or much demanded by way of security or 
guarantees. The perfect balance is unlikely to be found in any jurisdiction in a capitalist 
society. The law also is always unlikely to be satisfactory for that minority of debtors who, by 
reason of their lack of mental or physical wellbeing, are not so ill that their affairs can be 
looked after by another, such as an attorney or a guardian, but not are not well enough to look 
after their own affairs in a rational manner.  
 
My practical experience of being involved in the reform of the law in Scotland relating to 
bankruptcy, related above, is that at no stage did anyone in the Scottish Parliament or the 
Executive express any interest in any theories of bankruptcy law. All they cared about was 
whether voters would accept what they were proposing in terms of being fair to creditors and 
debtors. They wanted creditors to get back a reasonable amount of their potential losses, and 
they did not want blameless debtors to be treated harshly. It is noticeable that in the recent 
Law Commission reports on consumer interests in retailer insolvency, there is no reference to 
any theories of insolvency or bankruptcy either. 
 
Tribe seems to think England and Wales lack a theory of bankruptcy law. While his 
observations are illuminating, I would suggest that bankruptcy law is pretty similar world-
wide; that every developed country will have much the same difficulties; that most countries 
follow the principles that I have indicated above when drawing up their own laws; that there 
is nothing so special about England and Wales that it needs its own theory, written or not; 
that politicians, who at the end of the day are the ones who make the laws, are often 
indifferent to legal theories; and that judges are not inconvenienced by the absence of theory 
when making their decisions: they look at what the statute says and do what it says.  
Bankruptcy law does not need more theory: it just needs some rules that on the whole work 
reasonably well in most circumstances. It is a noble aspiration to say, as Tribe does, that we 
could do better. Another way of looking at it is that we have to work with what works, not 
always prefectly, much of the time, but that given the vagaries of human nature, the existing 
political process, and the resilience of existing vested interests, change is at best always likely 
to be tinkering and incremental – exactly as he fears.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
